Bold African Union role needed to stabilize eastern DRC

Bold African Union role needed to stabilize eastern DRC

The African Union lacks a coherent strategy that can reduce tensions between countries and improve security coordination.

Security in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and the Great Lakes is worsening despite numerous stabilization efforts. The increase in attacks since February by the M23 and other armed groups in the provinces of Ituri, North Kivu and South Kivu has increased deaths and forced displacements, making humanitarian access difficult.

The escalation has strained already strained relations between Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Multiple parallel and often competing regional initiatives have been launched to address the crisis, each facing considerable obstacles. The African Union (AU) has also sought solutions, but lacks a coherent strategy for the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Could such a strategy break the deadlock and open a path to stability in the region?

The Nairobi Process, led by former Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta under the auspices of the East African Community (EAC), included military and diplomatic efforts. The deployment of the EAC Regional Force from November 2022 to December 2023 facilitated a brief ceasefire between the warring parties and partially opened some supply routes. It also helped return displaced people in certain areas.

However, the Democratic Republic of the Congo expelled the force, claiming it had not attacked or disarmed insurgents, including M23. This widened the security gap and raised questions about the future of the Nairobi Process. Since then, attacks by armed groups have intensified, especially Sake and Goma, the capital of North Kivu, eroding the process and slowing momentum. A Great Lakes expert told the Institute for Security Studies PSC report that the initiative was kept alive thanks to the personal relationship of the president of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Félix Tshisekedi, with Kenyatta.

The AU has collaborated with ad hoc regional initiatives under the principle of subsidiarity

Meanwhile, tense relations between the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Kenya, which further deteriorated with the rise of the M23-affiliated Fleuve Congo Alliance movement, continue to limit prospects for a peaceful solution.

In December 2023, the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (SAMIDRC) entered the scene, taking over responsibilities left by the departing East African force. So far, the mission has gotten off to a shaky start. Shortages of financial resources and logistical and operational limitations suggest that it could suffer a similar fate to that of the East African Regional Force.

To date, only 800 of the promised 2,900 South African troops have been deployed and there is no confirmation that the 5,000 soldiers from Tanzania and Malawi have been deployed. Consequently, the M23 has taken more territory, attacking troops and causing casualties among South African and Tanzanian forces. In addition to Rwanda’s opposition to the deployment, SAMIDRC is sure to encounter numerous obstacles.

The Luanda Process, led by the President of Angola, João Lourenço, on behalf of the African Union (AU), is the most active political initiative aimed at stabilizing the region. Angola hosted the first EAC summit last June, which brought together the Economic Community of Central African States, the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region and SADC under the auspices of the AU. A framework was adopted to align existing peace initiatives, assign responsibilities, establish timelines and coordinate regional peace initiatives.

Many have criticized the AU’s lack of direct involvement as inadequate and distant.

Despite this progress, a meeting of the Luanda Process on the sidelines of the 37th AU summit in February revealed distrust and lack of acceptance of its initiatives. Efforts to encourage direct talks between Tshisekedi and Rwandan President Paul Kagame sparked animosity between the two. And although they finally agreed to new diplomatic commitments, accusations between Kigali and Kinshasa continue to prevent dialogue.

The AU has supported decisions arising from these peace efforts and has collaborated with ad hoc regional initiatives under the principle of subsidiarity. But many have criticized its lack of direct involvement as inadequate and distant, saying it needs a well-defined engagement strategy.

To date, the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework for the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Great Lakes, signed in 2013, is the AU’s most important initiative. It brings together 13 countries and four guarantor institutions. In 2023, the AU Peace and Security Council recognized this as the “most viable instrument to support the DRC and the institutions of the region to achieve peace and stability”, and called for it to be revitalized. Since then, steps have been taken to build trust between signatory countries, guarantors and other stakeholders, and ensure commitment to implementation.

The PSC also recently asked the AU Commission to accelerate the financing of the Crisis Reserve Fund of the AU Peace Fund and transfer equipment donated to SADC by the AU Continental Logistics Base in Douala, Cameroon, for support SAMIDRC operations.

Still, regional efforts overshadow the AU’s involvement in the DRC. A clearly defined AU strategy is needed that avoids duplication of regional measures, reduces competition for influence between states and regional groups, eliminates coordination gaps and limits ad hoc deployments.

The PSC should provide financing beyond the scarce allocations of the Crisis Reserve Fund

The strategy should depend on equipping a military force that can effectively combat the M23 and other armed groups. The PSC should provide sufficient funding beyond the meager allocations from the Crisis Reserve Fund to strengthen SAMIDRC operations. A pledging conference for the Democratic Republic of the Congo could attract funding from non-traditional sources, including the private sector. The recently adopted United Nations Security Council Resolution 2719 also provides an opportunity for the AU to obtain funding for SAMIDRC operations and logistics.

The deployment of the African Standby Force to eastern DRC could also allow for a more structured continental approach to the mobilization of troops and resources. This contrasts with current ad hoc regional deployments and their inherent limitations.

A diplomatic source said PSC report that despite the tensions between Kigali and Kinshasa, the leaders are open to talks under a tripartite agreement (DRC, Rwanda and Angola). This could open the door to concessions and a political solution through the Luanda Process.

This article was first published in the ISS PSC Report.

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