Closing gaps in UN tools that address conflict-related sexual violence

Since the Security Council first recognized conflict-related sexual violence (CRSV) as a threat to international peace and security in 2008, the United Nations (UN) has developed an increasing number of avenues to prevent and respond to such crimes. One such avenue is the Secretary-General’s annual report on CRSV, which includes an annexed list of perpetrators who are credibly suspected of committing or being responsible for patterns of CRSV violations in contexts on the Security Council agenda. This list can be a tool to publicly name perpetrators and open a door to participation that can facilitate behavioral changes.

The second tool is UN sanctions. Some sanctions regimes have designation criteria that allow perpetrators of sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) to be sanctioned for committing these violations. (While the Secretary-General reports on CRSV patterns, sanctions regimes use the broader term “SGBV.”)

Over the past two decades, the Security Council and the UN Secretariat have sought to increase links between the CRSV agenda and sanctions regimes. The Secretary-General has also consistently recommended increasing links between annual reports and sanctions. Based on our research, we found that the overlap between the two remains limited and that there are opportunities to improve their complementarity. We also found limitations in expert panels gathering evidence on SGBV cases as mandated by the UN Security Council, as well as political barriers within sanctions committees.

For our analysis, we focused on two aspects: (1) understanding the level of consistency between the parties listed in the annual report annex and the sanctions and (2) analyzing how sanctions have been used in response to SGBV. To make this determination, we look at overlap in two ways: first, whether the parties listed in the annex are also designated for sanctions, and second, whether the party is specifically sanctioned for committing sexual and gender-based violence ( as opposed to a different violation under the regime). ).

We based our research on the Secretary-General’s 2023 report published last summer covering the 2022 reporting period. In that report, 49 parties, both state and non-state, were listed in the annex because they committed or were responsible for patterns of violations. of the CRSV.

An important finding is that many of the parties listed in the Secretary-General’s annual reports are not sanctioned, even in contexts where sanctions regimes exist (see Figure 1). Of those who are sanctioned, the majority are for reasons other than sexual and gender violence.

In general, designations for SGBV violations are rare. Of the 614 people and 138 entities sanctioned, only 25 people and 2 entities are designated for committing sexual and gender violence. Therefore, although sexual violence is known to be widespread in many of the contexts where a sanctions regime exists, designations for committing SGBV represent less than 4% of the 752 currently sanctioned by the UN.

Why are there so few parties designated for VSG?

In trying to understand the reasons for these phenomena, we find that limitations in research and reporting by expert panels and political barriers within sanctions committees are the main causes.

The UN Security Council tasks panels of experts with developing detailed “case statements” about the alleged perpetrators, in which each documented violation is corroborated by a minimum of three carefully vetted witnesses or sources. Gathering this level of evidence can be quite difficult given security limitations, intentional blockades by state and non-state groups, and difficulty accessing remote areas. Even in cases where witnesses are accessible, they may be reluctant to participate due to embarrassment or lack of confidence.

Experts also work with very few resources; They receive modest salaries under difficult working conditions and do not receive additional resources, which may be necessary if witnesses need access to transportation, translation, or other services to facilitate interviews and investigation processes. This was cited as a major impediment to the experts’ work.

Experts also work with limited capacity, as humanitarian and human rights crimes are often covered by a single expert. Therefore, even for a country like the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), which has a huge number of armed groups and a huge territory, there is only one expert to investigate all humanitarian violations and sexual and gender-based violence throughout the country, making reporting extremely difficult. .

Despite these obstacles, political challenges are arguably the biggest obstacle to sexual and gender-based violence designations. Since sanctions committees operate on the basis of consensus, the degree to which designations are adopted depends on the political and working relationships of the committee members and the degree to which they have a common view on the role of sanctions in a given context. Thus, in some contexts such as Haiti or the Democratic Republic of the Congo, there has been greater consensus on the use of sanctions, including for sexual and gender violence. However, in other contexts this has been more difficult. For example, in Sudan, only three people are currently sanctioned (none for sexual and gender-based violence), and there have been no new designations since 2014 despite historically high levels of violence in Darfur and across the country.

The lack of SGBV designations is particularly pronounced for terrorist organizations. Although terrorist organizations have few (if any) sympathizers within the Council, there is a notable lack of sexual and gender-based violence designations for these organizations. Notably, the 1267 sanctions regime, which covers ISIS, Al-Qaida and associated groups, does not contain any designation criteria for humanitarian or human rights violations, including sexual and gender-based violence, despite some of the worst recorded atrocities. Even in anti-terrorist environments where sexual and gender violence criteria exist, these have been underused. For example, sexual and gender-based violence was added to the al-Shabaab regime in 2018, but no individuals are currently sanctioned under this criterion, despite al-Shabaab being a persistent perpetrator in the Secretary-General’s annual reports. , included in the list of the past. 9 years.

Elevate sexual and gender-based violence within UN sanctions regimes

The lack of sexual and gender-based violence designations, including persistent perpetrators listed by the Secretary-General, illustrates that these crimes are not always elevated to the same extent as other violations within UN sanctions regimes. Going forward, there are ways for Member States to elevate sexual and gender-based violence crimes and improve the connection between sanctions and the Secretary-General’s reports.

Firstly, Member States can explicitly include sexual and gender-based violence as a designation criterion in all sanctions regimes where sexual violence may be taking place. For example, Member States can add the criterion of sexual and gender-based violence to the 1267 regime so that actors within ISIS, Al-Qaida and associated elements can be sanctioned for these violations. Related to this, Member States can make more use of the sexual and gender-based violence criterion where it is available, including, for example, in the sanctions regime for Al Shabaab.

Member States may also increase the overlap between the parties listed by the Secretary-General and the sanctions regimes. Currently, there is no formal mechanism to ensure that sanctions committees review the Secretary-General’s reports. Creating a formal mechanism would ensure that sanctions committees review listed parties and consider designating them for sanctions.

Finally, member states can provide additional resources for expert panels. Groups must be provided with the resources necessary to fulfill their mandates, including translation and other basic services. Member States can also recruit more experts specializing in sexual and gender-based violence to sit on panels instead of having a single individual responsible for all violations of human rights and humanitarian law.

Despite the progress made by Member States and the United Nations over the last fifteen years to prevent and respond to SGBV, more work is needed. There are concrete ways to elevate sexual and gender-based violence within UN sanctions regimes and increase linkage to the Secretary-General’s reports. However, these measures require Member States to overcome political barriers and commit to preventing and responding to SGBV.

Jenna Russo is director of research at the International Peace Institute and director of the Brian Urquhart Center for Peace Operations.

Lauren McGowan is a policy analyst at the International Peace Institute.

This article is based on the authors’ report “UN tools to address conflict-related sexual violence: An analysis of inclusion and sanctions processes.”