Iran is gaining credibility throughout the Muslim world

Iran’s leadership has been a direct beneficiary of the months-long war in Gaza. With every missile Israel fires at Gaza, every U.S. veto of a U.N. Security Council ceasefire resolution, and every arrest of an anti-war protester on U.S. college campuses, Iran’s rejection of the U.S.-dominated world order wins. more credibility in the Muslim world. .

The ruling clerical regime in Iran has built its foreign policy on the pillar of anti-Americanism, rejecting what it sees as the “injustice” of American domination and the “intimidation” of other countries. Washington’s continued support for Israel’s war on Gaza in the face of growing international backlash has only reinforced this narrative.

While the United States has tried to backtrack and point out that humanitarian considerations should guide Israel’s conduct of the war, the damage to US credibility has already been done. Many people around the world – and specifically in Muslim countries – do not consider the United States’ belated warnings to Israel to be genuine.

And Tehran’s anti-Americanism message is resonating with large segments of the Muslim world’s public.

In a regional opinion poll conducted in late October, for example, only 7% of respondents said the United States had a positive impact on the war, compared to 40% who viewed Iran’s role as positive.

And in December, the highly respected Arab Barometer reported that Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s approval ratings had surpassed those of the Saudi crown prince and the president of the Emirates.

The political elite of the area observes with concern this change in Iran’s position in the region.

What Iran sought to achieve by attacking Israel

Iran’s image has been further enhanced by the fact that it is the only Muslim state to attack Israel in the context of public outrage over the war in Gaza.

The Iranian missile and drone attack on Israel on April 13 was calibrated to achieve two key objectives.

First, Iran’s leaders sought to preserve the country’s image as the self-proclaimed head of the “axis of resistance,” composed of its proxies in the region: Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthis in Yemen, and other militia groups in Iraq and Syria.

Iran also wanted to demonstrate the effectiveness of its deterrence model, which is based on the threat of retaliation against Israeli aggression through its proxy actors and the expansion of missile and drone technology.

Two weeks after the Israeli attack on its diplomatic mission in Damascus, Iran could not afford to outsource its response to its proxies. While it is clear that Iran was not prepared to start a war with Israel, failing to respond in kind to the Israeli attack would have made it appear weak and seriously diminished its standing among its allies and proxy groups.

But Iran’s leaders sought to minimize the damage and mitigate the risk of escalation by warning Israel of their attack in advance through intermediaries. In this way, Iran could save face without becoming embroiled in an all-out war.

Iran’s second goal was to demonstrate to the world that it has the drone and missile technology to strike back at Israel if it so chooses.

For more than a decade, Iran has displayed its missiles during annual military parades to back up its claim that it can attack Israel if threatened. More than 300 drones and missiles involved their attack last month. Although the damage was minimal, the attack was proof that Iran now has the ability to inflict pain on Israel.

Israel’s limited response to Iran suggests that war has been avoided, much to the relief of neighboring countries. But the long-term implications are more favorable for Iran. This show of force has likely helped his rejectionist foreign policy find receptive ears in the Muslim world and beyond.

When Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi visited Pakistan on April 23, for example, he was received like a celebrity. This was ironic since, earlier this year, Iran and Pakistan had engaged in retaliatory airstrikes.

The two countries agreed to boost bilateral trade to $10 billion a year, about five times the current level. They also issued a joint statement calling on the UN Security Council to take action against Israel, saying it had “illegally” attacked neighboring countries and foreign diplomatic compounds.

Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi also offered a message of support to Iran, saying:

China took note of Iran’s statement that its action was moderate and was an act of self-defense in response to the attack on its embassy.

What this could mean for the region

The implications of a more emboldened Iran for the region are serious. Iranian authorities feel vindicated by the events of the past seven months. This means that his anti-American and anti-Israel rhetoric will remain as strong as ever.

Iran’s missile and drone research and development program is also likely to receive a boost. And Iran’s support for its network of proxies and allies will remain strong, as this allows the Iranian leadership to project power beyond its borders and preserve its deterrence capacity.

None of this bodes well for Iran’s neighbors. An ideologically invigorated Islamic regime in Iran would be less accommodating to regional concerns, particularly those expressed by governments that have already normalized relations with Israel (such as the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain), or are believed to be moving in that direction (Saudi Arabia ). ).

Furthermore, the political credibility of many Arab leaders has suffered in the eyes of their citizens due to their perceived ineffectiveness in supporting the Palestinians in Gaza.

Iran’s leaders did not plan the series of events that began with the Hamas attacks on Israel on October 7. In fact, they were as surprised by Hamas’ actions as the Israeli intelligence agencies. But they are the obvious beneficiaries of the turn of events.

The United States and Israel are giving Iran and its message of defiance an enormous appeal, far beyond the imagination of the Iranian authorities.

Shahram Akbarzadeh is coordinator of the Middle East Studies Forum (MESF) and acting director of the Alfred Deakin Institute for Citizenship and Globalization at Deakin University.

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.